Cybersecurity Data Science (CSDS) Best Practices in an Emerging Profession

Scott Allen Mongeau INFORMS CAP[®]

Cybersecurity Data Scientist – SAS Institute PhD candidate - Nyenrode Business University, Netherlands

s.mongeau@edp1.nyenrode.nl scott@sark7.com scott.mongeau@sas.com

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INTRODUCTION

~30 years

- IT / data analysis and data management
- Statistics, analytics, simulation, data science...
- Cybersecurity Data Science
 - SAS Institute & Deloitte (~7 yrs)
- Technical & management consulting
 - Bio-pharma, telecom, finance, public sector
 - Military, defense, intelligence, security, policing
- Guest lecturer / PhD candidate
 - Nyenrode University, Netherlands





Cybersecurity Data Science (CSDS): Best Practices in an Emerging Profession Scott Mongeau, EDP PhD candidate

Scott Allen Mongeau

Cybersecurity Data Scientist – SAS Institute PhD candidate Nyenrode Business University (Netherlands)

s.mongeau@edp1.nyenrode.nl scott.mongeau@sas.com

@SARK7 #CSDS2020







LEADERSHIP, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, STEWARDSHIP Cybersecurity Data Science (CSDS): Best Practices in an Emerging Profession Scott Mongeau, EDP PhD candidate

I. Research Overview
II. Literature
III. Interviews
IV. Designs
V. Conclusions







LEADERSHIP, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, STEWARDSHIP



I. Research Overview

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PhD academic research / book~July 2020 release

Research on cybersecurity data science (CSDS) as an emerging profession

I. <u>Literature</u>: What is CSDS? Status as a profession?

- II. <u>Interviews</u>: 50 CSDS practitioners
- **III.** <u>Designs</u>: Approaches to address challenges

Cybersecurity Data Science: Best Practices in an Emerging Profession

Scott Mongeau


D Springer

PhD academic research / book

Research on cybersecurity data science (CSDS) as an emerging profession

- What is data science with respect to cybersecurity?
 - Professionalization maturity / best practices gap diagnosis
- Triangulated mixed methods
 - Qualitative and quantitative (inductive focus)
 - Literature review, interview coding, text analytics
- Gap analysis leading to design prescriptions

Practitioner Diagnostic & Design Research



Management of Information Systems (MIS)

Haag & Cummings, 2012 Hsu, 2013 Laudon & Laudon, 2017 Pearlson, Saunders, & Galletta, 2016 Sousa & Oz, 2014





II. CSDS Literature

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
FUD Fear, Uncertainty, Doubt

Expansion of exposure and targets >!< Increasing sophistication, frequency, and speed of attacks



Castle and Moat


How quaint!



"Bad news, Your Majesty—it's a cyberattack."









Data Science

New hope amidst complexity and confusion...

AGAIN 7 and U.



<u>CSDS</u>: Existing Professionals + Demonstrated Efficacy



https://www.sas.com/en_us/whitepapers/ponemonhow-security-analytics-improves-cybersecuritydefenses-108679.html

* Survey of 621 global IT security practitioners

Derived Professionalization Assessment Model

Professional maturity

- Systematic body of theory
 Authority and judgement
- recognized by client
- 3 Community sanctions authority
- 4 Ethical code of stewardship
- 5 Professional culture supported by associations

Greenwood, E. (1957). Attributes of a Profession. *Social Work, 2*, 11.


Van der Krogt, T. (2015). Professionals and Their Work.

Professional emergence

| 1 | Active, focused interest from diverse participants |
|----|---|
| 2 | Active professionals with associated job titles & roles |
| 3 | Emerging and informal training |
| 4 | Informal professional groups |
| 5 | Professional and industry literature |
| 6 | Research literature |
| 7 | Formalized training |
| 8 | Formal professional groups |
| 9 | Professional certifications |
| 10 | Standards bodies |
| 11 | Independent academic research disciplinary focus |

Beer, J. T., & Lewis, W. D. (1963). Aspects of the Professionalization of Science. *The MIT Press*, *92*(4), 20.

Freidson, E. (2001). *Professionalism: The Third Logic*. Cambridge, MA, U.S.: Polity Press.



PROFESSION DATA SCIENCE



The Blessing and Curse of Data Science

PROS

- Commercial interest
 - Range of methods
- Freedom to experiment
 - Delivers efficiencies
 - Big data engineering
 - Insightful questions
- Power of machine learning

CONS

- 🔶 Hype & noise
 - Befuddling array of approaches
 - Lack of standards
 - Myth of automation
 - Big data ipso facto is not solution
 - Wait, what is the question?
 - "Throwing the statistical baby out with grampa's bathwater?"

<u>Phantom Patterns</u>: Correlation ≠ Causation



The Ghost of Christmas Overfitting comes to visit

Are you or a friend addicted to predictive machine learning?

Key warning signs:

- Throwing 800 variables into a model and running with a good ROC score
- Need to retrain your model every three weeks?
- "Explanation!? We don't need no stinkin' explanation!"

If so, call 1-800-DIAGNOSTICS now!


CSDS Body of Literature (book length works)

| 1 | Machine Learning and Data Mining for Computer Security: Methods and Applications | * Maloof ed., 2006 | 13 | How to Measure Anything in Cybersecurity Risk | Hubbard & Seiersen, 2016 | |
|----|---|---------------------------------|-----------------|--|--|--|
| 2 | Intrusion Detection: A Machine Learning Approach | Yu & Tsai, 2011 | 14 | Data Analytics and Decision Support for Cybersecurity | * Carrascosa, Kalutarage, & Huang eds., 2017 | |
| 3 | Data Mining and Machine Learning in Cybersecurity | Dua & Du, 2011 | 15 | | Edgar & Manz, 2017 | |
| 4 | Network Anomaly Detection: A Machine Learning Perspective | Bhattacharyya & Kalita, 2013 | | | | |
| 5 | Applied Network Security Monitoring | Sanders & Smith, 2013 | 16 | Introduction to Machine Learning with Applications in Information Security | Stamp, 2017 | |
| 6 | Network Security Through Data Analysis | Collins, 2014 | 17 | Information Fusion for Cyber-Security Analytics | * Alsmadi, Karabatis, & AlEroud eds., 2017 | |
| 7 | Data Analysis for Network Cyber-Security | * Adams & Heard eds., 2014 | <mark>18</mark> | Machine Learning & Security | Chio & Freeman, 2018 | |
| 8 | Data-Driven Security | Jacobs & Rudis, 2014 | 19 | Data Science for Cybersecurity | Heard, Adams, Rubin-Delanchy, & Turcotte eds., 2018 | |
| 9 | | Baesens, Van Vlasselaer, | 20 | Al in Cybersecurity | * Sikos ed., 2018 | |
| | Social Network Techniques | & Verbeke, 2015 | 21 | Malware Data Science: Attack Detection and Attribution | Saxe & Sanders, 2018 | |
| 10 | Essential Cybersecurity Science | Dykstra, 2016 | | | | |
| 11 | Dynamic Networks and Cyber-Security | Adams & Heard, 2016 * | 22 | Machine Learning for Computer and Cyber Security | * Gupta & Sheng eds., 2019 | |
| 12 | Cybersecurity and Applied Mathematics | Metcalf & Casey, 2016 | 23 | Cybersecurity Analytics | Verma & Marchette, 2019 | |

Email me if there is a CSDS book you feel should be added! <u>scott@sark7.com</u>


| | | | | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|----------------------|------------------------|---------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------|------------------------|------------------------------|
| | | Focused Use Cases | Risk Quantification | Decision Support | Data Management | Data Collection | Scientific Methods | eature ingineering | Statistical Methods | Anomaly Detection | Machine Learning | Model Management | Visualization | Adversarial Methods | Organizational Management |
| Intrusion Detection: A Machine Learning Approach | Yu & Tsai, 2011 | ~ | | | | | | | 1 | 1 | > < | | | ~ | |
| Data Mining and Machine Learning in Cybersecurity | Dua & Du, 2011 | ~ | | ~ | 1 | | | ~ | 1 | 1 | | ~ | 1 | | |
| Network Anomaly Detection: A Machine Learning Perspective | Bhattacharyya & Kalita, 2013 | ~ | | ~ | | ~ | | <u>_</u> | 4 | 1 | ~ | ~ | 1 | ~ | |
| Applied Network Security 4 Monitoring | Sanders & Smith, 2013 | ~ | ~ | ~ | 1 | ~ | | × | \sim | \sim | | | 1 | | ~ |
| Network Security Through Data 5 Analysis | Collins, 2014 | ~ | | ~ | ~ | ~ | Dol | | | | | 2000 | <- E(| <u></u> | |
| Data Analysis for Network Cyber-Security | Adams & Heard, 2014 * | ~ | | ~ | | ~ | | | • | | cover | • | | U70 | |
| 7 Data-Driven Security | Jacobs & Rudis, 2014 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ● Ri | sk ai | lant | ifica | tion: | 50% | | | 1 |
| Fraud Analytics Using | Baesens, Van | | | | | | 1.11 | JK YC | ant | meu | cion. | 5070 | | | |
| Descriptive, Predictive, and Social Network Techniques | Vlasselaer, & Verbeke, 2015 | ~ | ~ | ~ | 1 | ~ | • Da | ata m | nana | igen | nent: | 50% | | | ~ |
| 9 Science | Dykstra, 2016 | ~ | 1 | ~ | ~ | | • Sc | ienti | fic n | neth | ods: | 25% | | | 4 |
| Dynamic Networks and Cyber- 10 Security | Adams & Heard, 2016 * | ~ | ~ | | | | | | | | | | onti | 250/ | |
| Cybersecurity and Applied 11 Mathematics | Metcalf & Casey, 2016 | | | 1 | | | • 01 | gain | Zatio | Jiai | mana | agem | ent. | 2570 | |
| How to Measure Anything in 12 Cybersecurity Risk | Hubbard & Seiersen, 2016 | | 1 | \checkmark | | | ~ | | 1 | | | ~ | 1 | | 1 |
| Data Analytics and Decision Support for Cybers ecurity | Carrascosa, Kalutarage, & Huang, 2017 * | ~ | 4 | ~ | ~ | ~ | | ~ | 1 | ~ | ~ | ~ | ~ | ~ | |
| Introduction to Machine Learning with Applications in 14 Information Security | Stamp, 2017 | 1 | | | • | | | ~ | 1 | ~ | ~ | ~ | ~ | 1 | |
| Information Fusion for Cyber- 15 Security Analytics | Alsmadi, Karabatis, & AlEroud, 2017 * | 1 | \checkmark | ~ | ~ | ~ | | ~ | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ~ | |
| 16 Machine Learning & Security | Chio & Freeman, 2018 | ~ | | 1 | 1 | ~ | | ~ | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ✓ | 1 | |
| Data Science for Cybersecurity | Heard, Adams, Rubin- Delanchy, & Turcotte, | ~ | | ~ | | ~ | | ~ | ~ | ~ | ~ | ~ | | ~ | |
| 18 AI in Cybersecurity | Sikos, 2018 * | ~ | | ✓ | ~ | | | 1 | 1 | | 1 | 1 | | 1 | |
| Malware Data Science: Attack 19 Detection and Attribution | Saxe & Sanders, 2018 | ~ | • · | | | ~ | | ~ | ~ | ~ | 1 | ~ | 1 | ~ | |
| Machine Learning for 20 Computer and Cyber Security | Gupta & Sheng, 2019 * | √ | ~ | 1 | | | | ~ | ~ | ~ | ~ | ~ | | ~ | |
| | | 90% | 50% | 80% | 50% | 65% | 25% | 90% | 100% | 90% | 75% | 80% | 80% | 80% | 25% |

Table 2.11: CSDS topic coverage across central literature





Calvin.Andrus (2012) Depicts a mash-up of disciplines from which Data Science is derived http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:DataScienceDisciplines.png



'Professional Maturity' Comparison


| # | CRITERIA | CYBER | DS | CSDS | CYBER = |
|----|---------------------------|-------|----|------|--|
| 1 | Broad interest | • | • | • | Growing challenges + |
| 2 | People employed | • | • | • | rapid paradigm shift |
| 3 | Informal training | • | • | O | |
| 4 | Informal groups | • | • | O | |
| 5 | Professional literature | • | • | • | DATA SCIENCE = |
| 6 | Research literature | • | • | | Poorly defined standards "whatever you want it to be! |
| 7 | Formal training | • | | o | whatever you want it to be |
| 8 | Formal prof. groups | • | D | 0 | |
| 9 | Professional certificates | • | o | 0 | |
| 10 | Standards bodies | • | 0 | 0 | CSDS = At risk problem child? |
| 11 | Academic discipline | • | o | 0 | At tisk problem child: |

CSDS ≈ **Medieval Medicine**?




| Medieval Medicine | CSDS |
|---|--|
| Understandings of basic anatomy | Good knowledge of networking, devices & architectures |
| Surgical treatments are extremely painful and dangerous | Interventions frequently involve leaches, saws, knives, and hammers |
| Poor understanding of functional biotic processes and interaction of organs | Security field lacking in strong scientific foundations & general theory |
| Just about anyone can be a physician | Just about anyone can be a (cybersecurity) data scientist |

SCIENCE CYBERSECURITY DATA PROFESSION



SUPPLY



Т

R

A



III. CSDS Interviews

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Participants - Sample

50 participants + 150 years collective CSDS experience (3 yr mean)

- Linked-In search
 - 'cybersecurity' + ('data scientist' or 'analytics')
- ~350 professionals globally
 - Direct outreach
 - Follow-on referrals

Gating to exclude 'ceremonial CSDS'


• i.e. sales, recruiting, marketing, technology strategists

Aspects of methodological integrity addressed in write-up

• i.e. selection bias, representativeness of sample, etc.

Demographic Profile (n=50)

LinkedIn => 350 candidates => 50 participants



* Estimates inferred from LinkedIn profile data

Demographic Profile (n=50)

Current Region



| Current Region ¹ | n | % |
|-----------------------------|----|-----|
| North America | 35 | 70% |
| Western Europe | 10 | 20% |
| Eastern Europe | 2 | 4% |
| Middle East | 2 | 4% |
| South America | 1 | 2% |

22% (n=11) relocated from native region 18% (n=9) relocated to US specifically 10% (n=5) relocated specifically from Asia/Pacific to US



| Industry | n | % |
|-----------------------|----|-----|
| Software and services | 28 | 56% |
| Consulting | 7 | 14% |
| Finance/financial | | |
| services/insurance | 7 | 14% |
| Government / military | 3 | 6% |
| Consumer products | 2 | 4% |
| Academics / research | 2 | 4% |
| Telecom | 1 | 2% |



| Gender | n | % |
|--------|----|-----|
| Male | 43 | 86% |
| Female | 7 | 14% |

CSDS Practitioner Interview Research

Qualitative: 30 minute open response interviews

- **<u>ENTRY</u>**: How did you become involved in domain?
- What <u>TRENDS</u> are emerging?
 What are perceived central <u>CHALLENGES</u>?
 - What are key <u>BEST PRACTICES</u>?
 - **METHODS**: Borrowing from adjacent domains?
 - **THREATS**: Trends on the adversarial side?

Methodology: Interview Topic Labeling (CODING) Inductive Extrapolation and Deductive Refinement

| +scientist,science,+activity,+data scientist,cyber |
|--|
| +instance,+positive,false,+false positive,+obtain |
| +behavior,+anomaly,detection,+attack,false |
| right,+risk,+day,+case,+aspect |
| machine,machine learning,learning,+industry,ml |
| quality,+process,+process,collection,data quality |
| cyber security,+tool,+little,+hard,malicious |
| +tool,+integrate,job,+user,knowledge |

Topic extraction Agglomerative => multi-doc

Text analytics processing

- Engine: SAS Contextual Analysis
- Natural Language Processing (NLP)
- Latent Semantic Indexing (LSI)
- Singular Value Decomposition (SVD)

training +industry 'machine learning' +apply pretty 'data science' +market analysis ml +area machine +algorithm +domain +defense 'as well' +behavior false +anomaly +positive 'as well' +event +false positive' detection +point well important +solution +automate learning +label

+instance +'false positive' +allow +depend +extract +obtain +amount +'different thing' +add +deal +positive +collect +mention false information +integrate 'yober security' +trend +approach cyber better +business +field +depend +large +know +good +machine +hard +scientist cybersecurity definitely +address +increase +automate +complexity +defense +industry +mention +threat +attacker +issue right +device +tool 'big data' privacy +implement +process +decision +technique +big quality +algorithm +bring +solve difficult +method +year +apply +buy +day money +long +aspect +source +network especially +case right +area +start +bring cybersecurity +big

Concept clustering Divisive => unique doc


Content analytics extrapolated themes

Domain literature: sensitizing concepts

Practitioner review

'Coding' of processed interview transcripts

Key topics (codes)



DATA PREPARATION! 84%

Marketing hype 70%

Establishing context 60%

Labeled incidents (evidence) 56%

CSDS 'CHALLENGES': 11

| CODED RESPONSES: Perceived Challenges | Ν | % | 0% | 50% | 100% |
|--|----|-----|----|-----|------|
| CH1: Data preparation (access, volume, integration, quality, transformation, selection) | 42 | 84% | | | |
| CH2: Unrealistic expectations proliferated by marketing hype | 35 | 70% | | | |
| CH3: Contextual nature of normal versus anomalous behavioral phenomenon | 30 | 60% | | | |
| CH4: Lack of labeled incidents to focus detection | 28 | 56% | | | |
| CH5: Own infrastructure, shadow IT, and proliferation of exposure | 27 | 54% | | | |
| CH 6: Uncertainty leads to ineffective reactive stance | 25 | 50% | | | |
| CH 7: Traditional rules-based methods result in too many alerts | 25 | 50% | | | |
| CH 8: Program ownership, decision making, and processes | 20 | 40% | | | |
| CH 9: Resourcing, developing, & hosting in house | 16 | 32% | | | |
| CH 10: Expanding breadth and complexity of cyber domain | 16 | 32% | | | |
| CH 11: Policy, privacy, regulatory, and fines | 15 | 30% | | | |

Best Practices: 26 Codes

Manageme ٠ **Training &**

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| BP1: Structured data preparation, discovery, engineering processProc storageBP14: Cloud and container-based tools and data storageTechBP2: Building process focused cross- functional teamOrgBP15: Distinct exploration and detection architecturesTechBP3: Cross-training team in data science, cyber, engineeringOrgBP15: Distinct exploration and detection architecturesTechBP4: Scientific method as a processProcBP17: Deriving probabilistic and risk modelsOrgBP4: Scientific method as a processProcBP17: Deriving probabilistic and risk modelsOrgBP6: Vulnerability, anomaly & decision automation to operational capacityTechBP19: Human-in-the-loop reinforcementProcBP7: Data normalization, frameworks & ontologiesTechBP20: Survey academic methods and techniquesOrgOrgBP8: Model validation and transparencyProcBP21: Cyber risk as general enterprise risk & rewardOrgBP9: Data-driven paradigm shift away from rules & signaturesProcBP23: Adding machine learning to SIEMTechBP11: Cyclical unsupervised and supervised machine learningProcBP24: Preventative threat intelligenceOrgYBP12: Address Al hype and unrealistic expectations directlyOrgBP25: Hosting and pushing detection to endpointsTechBP13: Understand down infrastructure & MP13: Understand down infrastructure & MP13: Understand own infrastructure & MP13: Understand own infrastructure & MP13: Understand own infrastructure &OrgBP26: Hosting and pushing detection to endpointsTec | | Best practice codes* | | | | 1 |
|--|---|--|------|---|------|----------|
| BP2: Building process focused cross- functional teamOrg architecturesBP15: Distinct exploration and detection architecturesTechBP3: Cross-training team in data science, cyber, engineeringOrgBP16: Participate in data sharing consortiums and initiativesTechBP4: Scientific method as a processProcBP17: Deriving probabilistic and risk modelsOrgBP5: Instill core cyber domain knowledgeOrgBP18: Upper management buy in and supportOrgBP6: Vulnerability, anomaly & decision automation to operational capacityTechBP19: Human-in-the-loop reinforcementProcBP7: Data normalization, frameworks & ontologiesTechBP20: Survey academic methods and techniquesOrgBP8: Model validation and transparencyProcBP21: Cyber risk as general enterprise risk & rewardOrgBP10: Track and label incidents and exploitsProcBP23: Adding machine learning to SIEMTechBP11: Cyclical unsupervised and supervised machine learningProcBP24: Preventative threat intelligenceOrgBP12: Address Al hype and unrealistic expectations directlyOrgBP25: Hosting and pushing detection to endpointsTechBP12: Understand own infrastructure & expectations directlyOrgDrgProcBP13: Understand own infrastructure & expectations directlyOrgTechTech | | | Proc | | Tech | |
| Cyber, engineeringCyber, engineeringCyber, engineeringCyber, engineeringCyber, engineeringBP4: Scientific method as a processProcBP17: Deriving probabilistic and risk modelsOrgBP5: Instill core cyber domain knowledgeOrgBP18: Upper management buy in and supportOrgBP6: Vulnerability, anomaly & decision automation to operational capacityTechBP19: Human-in-the-loop reinforcementProcBP7: Data normalization, frameworks & ontologiesTechBP20: Survey academic methods and techniquesOrgBP8: Model validation and transparencyProcBP21: Cyber risk as general enterprise risk & rewardOrgBP9: Data-driven paradigm shift away from rules & signaturesOrgBP22: Segment risk programmatically and outsource componentsOrgBP11: Cyclical unsupervised and supervised machine learningProcBP24: Preventative threat intelligenceOrgBP12: Address Al hype and unrealistic expectations directlyOrgBP25: Hosting and pushing detection to endpointsTechBP12: Hudrest and own infrastructure & Method with frastructure & Method with rest and own infrastructure & Method with rest and pushing detection to endpointsTech | 2 | BP2: Building process focused cross- | Org | BP15: Distinct exploration and detection | Tech | |
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| expectations directly BP25: Hosting and pushing detection to endpoints actices~ | | <i>,</i> , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Proc | BP24: Preventative threat intelligence | Org | Y |
| BP13: Understand own infrastructure & Org BP26: Honourats to track and observe adversaries. Tech | | | Org | BP25: Hosting and pushing detection to endpoints | Tech | actices~ |
| environment BP26: Honeypots to track and observe adversaries | | | Org | BP26: Honeypots to track and observe adversaries | Tech | lization |

Architecture-driven solutions

CSDS 'BEST PRACTICES': 26

DATA PREPARATION! 84%

| RESPONSES: Advocated best practices | Family | Ν | X |
|--|--------|----|-----|
| BP1: Structured data preparation, discovery, engineering process | Proc | 42 | 84% |
| | | | |
| BP2: Building process focused cross-functional team | Org | 38 | 76% |
| BP3: Cross-training team in data science, cyber, engineering | Org | 37 | 74% |
| BP4: Scientific method as a process | Proc | 34 | 68% |
| BP5: Instill core cyber domain knowledge | Org | 33 | 66% |
| BP6: Vulnerability, anomaly & decision automation to operational capacity | Tech | 33 | 66% |
| BP7: Data normalization, frameworks & ontologies | Tech | 32 | 64% |
| BP8: Model validation and transparency | Proc | 31 | 62% |
| BP9: Data-driven paradigm shift away from rules & signatures | Org | 29 | 58% |
| BP10: Track and label incidents and exploits | Proc | 28 | 56% |
| BP11: Cyclical unsupervised and supervised machine learning | Proc | 25 | 50% |
| BP12: Address AI hype and unrealistic expectations directly | Org | 23 | 46% |
| BP13: Understand own infrastructure & environment | Org | 23 | 46% |
| | | | |

| 0 | colla | abc | orati | on | 76% | 6 |
|---|-------|-----|-------|-----|-----|------|
| | | | % | 50% | , | 100% |
| 2 | 84% | | | | | |
| 3 | 76% | | | | 2 | |
| 7 | 74% | | | | | |
| 1 | 68% | | | | | |
| 3 | 66% | | | | | |
| 3 | 66% | | | | | |
| 2 | 64% | | - | | | |
| 1 | 62% | | | | | |
| Э | 58% | | | | | |
| 3 | 56% | | | | | |
| 5 | 50% | | | | | |
| 3 | 46% | | | | | |
| 3 | 46% | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |


Cross-domain


Scientific rigor 68%

| SPONSES: Advocated best practices Family | N S | % 0 | % | 50% | 100% |
|--|------|-----|-----|-----|------|
| BP14: Cloud and container-based tools and data storage | Tech | 22 | 44% | | |
| BP15: Distinct exploration and detection architectures | Tech | 22 | 44% | | |
| BP16: Participate in data sharing consortiums and initiatives | Tech | 21 | 42% | | |
| BP17: Deriving probabilistic and risk models | Org | 20 | 40% | | |
| BP18: Upper management buy in and support | Org | 16 | 32% | | |
| BP19: Human-in-the-loop reinforcement | Proc | 14 | 28% | | |
| BP20: Survey academic methods and techniques | Org | 13 | 26% | | |
| BP21: Cyber risk as general enterprise risk & reward | Org | 12 | 24% | | |
| BP22: Segment risk programmatically and outsource components | Org | 9 | 18% | | |
| BP23: Adding machine learning to SIEM | Tech | 5 | 10% | | |
| BP24: Preventative threat intelligence | Org | 4 | 8% | | |
| BP25: Hosting and pushing detection to endpoints | Tech | 4 | 8% | | |
| BP26: Honeypots to track and observe adversaries | Tech | 2 | 4% | | |


Factor Analysis: 6 Challenge and 6 Best Practice Themes

Exploratory factor analysis (extraction of latent factors across responses)





Interpretation: Best Practice as Perceived 'Gap' (Required Objective)




Challenge to Best Practice Factor Correlation


| CH1: Data preparation (access, vo integration, quality, transformation CH2: Unrealistic expectations prol marketing hype | n, selection) | | | BP1: Structured data preparation, discovery, engineering process BP2: Building process focused cross- functional team | Proc Org | BP14: Cloud and container-based tools and data storage BP15: Distinct exploration and detection architectures | Tech Tech |
|---|---------------|---|-----------------------------------|--|-------------|--|--------------|
| CH3: Contextual nature of normal anomalous behavioral phenomenc | | factors: diagnosed gaps | Best practice factors: | prescribed treatments | Org | BP16: Participate in data sharing consortiums and initiatives | Tech |
| CH4: Lack of labeled incidents to fo | CH F1: Ex | pansive complexity | BP F2: Cross-domain collaboration | | Proc | BP17: Deriving probabilistic and risk models | Org Org |
| CH5: Own infrastructure, shadow proliferation of exposure | CH F2: Tra | acking and context | BP F1: Scientific proce | ess | Org Tech | BP18: Upper management buy in and support BP19: Human-in-the-loop reinforcement | Proc |
| CH 6: Uncertainty leads to ineffect stance | CH F3. Da | ta management | BP F4: Data-driven / c | 5 | Tech | BP20: Survey academic methods and techniques | Org |
| CH 7: Traditional rules-based met | cirro. Du | | BP F2: Cross-domain collaboration | | Proc | BP21: Cyber risk as general enterprise risk & reward | Org |
| too many alerts CH 8: Program ownership, decisior | CH F5: Un | iclear ownership | BP F2: Cross-domain | collaboration | Org | BP22: Segment risk programmatically and outsource components | Org |
| processes | | | | DF10. Track and taber incluents and exploits | Proc | BP23: Adding machine learning to SIEM | Tech |
| CH 9: Resourcing, developing, & h house | osting in | Innovations | | BP11: Cyclical unsupervised and supervised machine learning | Proc | BP24: Preventative threat intelligence | Org |
| CH 10: Expanding breadth and cor | nplexity of | drive | drive | BP12: Address AI hype and unrealistic expectations directly | Org | BP25: Hosting and pushing detection to endpoints | Tech |
| cyber domain CH 11: Policy, privacy, regulatory, | and fines | Cybersecurity | Data science | BP13: Understand own infrastructure & environment | Org | BP26: Honeypots to track and observe adversaries | Tech |
| | | challenges address - CSDS prescriptions | methods inform | | | | |


KEY CSDS GAPS: Factor-to-Factor Fitting



Root Cause Analysis: Fishbone / Ishikawa Diagram











IV. CSDS Designs

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


Data Management: EDA Process + Feature Engineering



SOURCE: Alice Zheng, Amanda Casari. 2016. Feature Engineering for Machine Learning Models. O'Reilly Media.


Featurization: Example - Graph Analytics




Exploratory Data Analysis (EDA): Example – Probabilistic Analysis

Exception Events

Exception messages per user (ranked)







| Quantiles | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------|----------|----------|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| 100.0% | maximum | 2559 | | | | | | | |
| 99.5% | | 2559 | | | | | | | |
| 97.5% | | 1889.725 | | | | | | | |
| 90.0% | | 517.5 | | | | | | | |
| 75.0% | quartile | 172.75 | | | | | | | |
| 50.0% | median | 55.5 | | | | | | | |
| 25.0% | quartile | 9.75 | | | | | | | |
| 10.0% | | 3.3 | | | | | | | |
| 2.5% | | 1.825 | | | | | | | |
| 0.5% | | 1 | | | | | | | |
| 0.0% | minimum | 1 | | | | | | | |


| Summary Statistics | | | | | | | |
|--------------------|-----------|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| Mean | 184.01786 | | | | | | |
| Std Dev | 380.96684 | | | | | | |
| Std Err Mean | 35.997982 | | | | | | |
| Upper 95% Mean | 255.35026 | | | | | | |
| Lower 95% Mean | 112.68545 | | | | | | |
| N | 112 | | | | | | |


Feature Reduction: Example - Principal Component Analysis (PCA)






Entity Resolution






Entity Relational Specification






CSDS Data Processing EDA + Feature Engineering (example)





Root Cause Analysis: Fishbone / Ishikawa Diagram



* Resulting from factor analysis and factor-to-factor fitting


CSDS: What type of science is it?

Controlled experiments versus Pattern extrapolation



Research Methods for Cybersecurity

- Experimental
 - i.e. hypothetical-deductive and quasi-experimental
- Applied
 - i.e. applied experiments and observational studies
- Mathematical
 - ➢ i.e. theoretical and simulation-based
- Observational
 - i.e. exploratory, descriptive, machine learning-based




Manz, D. and Edgar, T. (2017) Research Methods for Cyber Security

Labels: What constitutes 'evidence'?

EXAMPLES OF SECURITY EVIDENCE

- Rules & - Field evidence Collected - Probing & signatures - Research & testing - 3rd party threat sourced intelligence Synthesized - Red Teaming - Expert opinion - Simulations - Thought - Laboratory experiments Inductive Deductive
- 1. Field evidence (e.g. observed incidents)
- 2. Sourcing own data from field testing (e.g. local experiments)
- 3. Honeypots
- 4. IDSs (Intrusion Detection Systems)
- 5. Simulation findings
- 6. Laboratory testing (e.g. malware in a staged environment)
- 7. Stepwise discovery (iterative interventions)
- 8. Pen testing (attempts to penetrate the network)
- 9. Red teaming (staged attacks to achieve particular goals)
- 10. Incidents (records associated with confirmed incidents)
- 11. Reinforcement learning (self-improving ML to achieve a goal)
- 12. Research examples (datasets recording attacks from research)
- 13. Expert review (opinion and guidance from experts)
- 14. Intelligence feed (indications from a 3rd party service)
- 15. Thought experiments (e.g. boundary conditions, counterfactuals)

Discovery \Leftrightarrow **Detection**




SEGMENTATION

CATEGORIZATION

Technology: Architect Exploratory & Detection Platforms*


Functional Architectural Segmentation



* Runs counter to the industry vendor stance of store 'all-the-data-all-the-time'




CSDS as a **Process: Discovery and Detection**





Unsupervised Discovery


Disassociating 'Normal' from 'Abnormal'



DEVIATION FROM OWN PATTERNS (OWN & PEER GROUP)


CSDS Theory Development

Example: Cyborg Network Behavioral Principals



Pareto Principle

- 80/20% pattern in network-usage
- Outliers: multiple devices 24 hours online
- High correlation: hrs online and breadth of activities
- Pattern observed across multiple networks



% Users to % Hours Active

'The Normals'*

22 weeks of behavioral clustering


SIX MAJORS PEER GROUP CLUSTERS

1: Infrequent users (~50%)
 2: Sporadic use / low activity (~20%)
 3: Active / specialized (~15%)
 4: Active generalists (~6%)
 5: Very active / specialized (~6%)
 6: Sporadic high-low active (~3%)


* After 2% 'unusuals' removed








Staged Discovery Process




Domain


CSDS: High-Level Functional Process




Organization: Interdisciplinary Collaboration



Continuous Detection Improvement Process



CSDS Model Development Process




- Conceptual model
- Hypotheses
- Counterfactuals
- Falsification



V. Conclusions

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CSDS: A Work in Progress

Process of Professionalization

- Named professionals
- Set of methods and techniques
- Standards, best practices

Training programs

Certifications

Academic degree programs Focused research journals


Formal sub-specialization





Specialist Researcher Primary Care Surgeon Diagnostician Emergency Care

Foundation: CSDS Maturity Framework



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Cybersecurity Data Science (CSDS) Best Practices in an Emerging Profession

Scott Allen Mongeau INFORMS CAP[®]

Cybersecurity Data Scientist – SAS Institute PhD candidate - Nyenrode Business University, Netherlands

s.mongeau@edp1.nyenrode.nl scott@sark7.com scott.mongeau@sas.com


@SARK7 #CSDS2020

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APPENDIX


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Research Overview

RESEARCH OBJECTIVE: <u>Diagnose</u> and <u>prescribe</u> treatment <u>designs</u> to address <u>gaps</u> *impeding the development of CSDS professional practice*

- **DIAGNOSTIC RESEARCH:** Undertaken to analyse, diagnose, and prescribe design treatments to address gaps resident in CSDS practice
- BUSINESS GOAL: Facilitate professional advancement of the CSDS domain by addressing 'body of theory' gaps
- <u>ACADEMIC CONTRIBUTION</u>
 - <u>Diagnosis</u> for a novel topic definition and awareness of a problem
 => addresses research lacuna
 - <u>Design prescriptions</u> to address empirically identified gaps conceptual and theoretical suggestions to address practical shortcomings => addresses management theory need
 90



CSDS High-Level Overview

- Represents a partial paradigm shift from traditional cybersecurity
 - Cybersecurity = rule-and-signature-based and focuses on boundary protection
 - CSDS = situational awareness and assumes persistent and prolific threats
- CSDS is data focused
- Applies quantitative, algorithmic, and probabilistic methods
- Attempts to quantify risk
- Focuses on producing focused and efficacious alerts
- Promotes inferential methods to categorize behavioral patterns
- Ultimately seeks to optimize cybersecurity operations
- Emerges from two parent domains...
- Which themselves are undergoing rapid transformation
- As such, 'body of theory' surrounding CSDS is evolving

CSDS Definition

- The practice of data science...
- to assure the continuity of digital devices, systems, services, software, and agents...
- in pursuit of the stewardship of systemic cybersphere stability,...
- spanning technical, operational, organizational, economic, social, and political contexts

CSDS Curriculum Design I

- 1.0 Introduction to the CSDS field 1.1. Cybersecurity basics and challenges
 - 1.2. Data science basics and challenges
 - 1.3. CSDS as a focused hybrid domain
 - 1.4. Differentiating analytics goals and methods
 - 1.5. Framing the cybersecurity analytics lifecycle
 - 1.6. Introducing cybersecurity analytics maturity

- 2.0 Cybersecurity data: challenges, sources, features, methods
 - 2.1. Sources of cybersecurity data, research datasets, types of evidence
 - 2.2. Examples: log files and network traffic
 - 2.3. Data preparation, quality, and processing
 - 2.4. Statistical exploration and analysis (EDA)
 - 2.5. Feature engineering and selection
 - 2.6. Feature extraction and advanced methods
 - 2.7. Positioning and handling real-time and streaming data

CSDS Curriculum Design II

- 3.0 Exploration and discovery: pattern extraction, segmentation, baselining, and anomalies
 - 3.1. Building contextual knowledge
 - 3.2. Segmentation and categorization
 - 3.3. Multivariate analysis
 - 3.4. Parameterization and probability
 - 3.5. Outliers and differentiating normal from abnormal
 - 3.6. Anomaly types, anomaly gain, and detection
 - 3.7. Unsupervised machine learning
 - 3.8. Establishing a foundation for prediction

- 4.0 Prediction and detection: models, incidents, and validation
 - 4.1. Distinguishing explanation versus prediction
 - 4.2. Framing detective analytics: combining explanation and prediction
 - 4.3. Econometric approaches
 - 4.4. Predictive machine learning (supervised machine learning)
 - 4.5. Deep learning
 - 4.6. Reinforcement learning
 - 4.7. Model diagnostics and management
 - 4.8. Bootstrapping detection: semi-supervised machine learning

CSDS Curriculum Design III

• 5.0 Operationalization: CSDS as-a-process

- 5.1. Analytics process management: integrating discovery and detection
- 5.2. Human-in-the-loop: integrating investigations and investigative feedback
- 5.3. Robo-automation, online machine learning, and self-improving processes
- 5.4. Technical and functional architectures
- 5.5. Systems integration and orchestration
- 5.6. Cybersecurity analytics maturity recap
- 5.7. Cybersecurity risk and optimization
- 5.8. Guidance on implementing CSDS programs

